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Safe-Linking is a security mechanism that protects single-linked
lists (such as the fastbins) from being tampered by attackers. The
mechanism makes use of randomness from ASLR (mmap_base), and when
combined with chunk alignment integrity checks, it protects the
pointers from being hijacked by an attacker.
While Safe-Unlinking protects double-linked lists (such as the small
bins), there wasn't any similar protection for attacks against
single-linked lists. This solution protects against 3 common attacks:
* Partial pointer override: modifies the lower bytes (Little Endian)
* Full pointer override: hijacks the pointer to an attacker's location
* Unaligned chunks: pointing the list to an unaligned address
The design assumes an attacker doesn't know where the heap is located,
and uses the ASLR randomness to "sign" the single-linked pointers. We
mark the pointer as P and the location in which it is stored as L, and
the calculation will be:
* PROTECT(P) := (L >> PAGE_SHIFT) XOR (P)
* *L = PROTECT(P)
This way, the random bits from the address L (which start at the bits
in the PAGE_SHIFT position), will be merged with the LSB of the stored
protected pointer. This protection layer prevents an attacker from
modifying the pointer into a controlled value.
An additional check that the chunks are MALLOC_ALIGNed adds an
important layer:
* Attackers can't point to illegal (unaligned) memory addresses
* Attackers must guess correctly the alignment bits
On standard 32 bit Linux machines, an attacker will directly fail 7
out of 8 times, and on 64 bit machines it will fail 15 out of 16
times.
The proposed solution adds 3-4 asm instructions per malloc()/free()
and therefore has only minor performance implications if it has
any. A similar protection was added to Chromium's version of TCMalloc
in 2013, and according to their documentation the performance overhead
was less than 2%.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyalit@checkpoint.com>
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This fix commit 76dfc7ce8c "Some requested additional malloc entry points"
from 2004's
Signed-off-by: Leonid Lisovskiy <lly.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@uclibc-ng.org>
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Signed-off-by: Peter S. Mazinger <ps.m@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Bernhard Reutner-Fischer <rep.dot.nop@gmail.com>
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sed -i -e '/Experimentally off - /d' $(grep -rl "Experimentally off - " *)
sed -i -e '/^\/\*[[:space:]]*libc_hidden_proto(/d' $(grep -rl "libc_hidden_proto" *)
should be a nop
Signed-off-by: Bernhard Reutner-Fischer <rep.dot.nop@gmail.com>
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Appears to build fine (several .configs tried)
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things, and avoid potential deadlocks caused when a thread holding a uClibc
internal lock get canceled and terminates without releasing the lock. This
change also provides a single place, bits/uClibc_mutex.h, for thread libraries
to modify to change all instances of internal locking.
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most of global data relocations are back
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gone from libc. The remaining are left as exercise for others ;-)
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missing headers, other jump relocs removed
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Lea. It is about 2x faster than the old malloc-930716, and behave itself much
better -- it will properly release memory back to the system, and it uses a
combination of brk() for small allocations and mmap() for larger allocations.
-Erik
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