diff options
| author | Eyal Itkin <eyalit@checkpoint.com> | 2019-12-27 18:45:20 +0200 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org> | 2020-02-16 12:32:21 +0100 | 
| commit | 886878b22424d6f95bcdeee55ada72049d21547c (patch) | |
| tree | c1ca8f9ac64bb6750e8b949635ec87963b454848 /libc/stdlib/malloc-standard | |
| parent | 90f24fc94897d93deb80d933d18a4f31dc6bf05a (diff) | |
Add Safe-Linking to fastbins
Safe-Linking is a security mechanism that protects single-linked
lists (such as the fastbins) from being tampered by attackers. The
mechanism makes use of randomness from ASLR (mmap_base), and when
combined with chunk alignment integrity checks, it protects the
pointers from being hijacked by an attacker.
While Safe-Unlinking protects double-linked lists (such as the small
bins), there wasn't any similar protection for attacks against
single-linked lists. This solution protects against 3 common attacks:
  * Partial pointer override: modifies the lower bytes (Little Endian)
  * Full pointer override: hijacks the pointer to an attacker's location
  * Unaligned chunks: pointing the list to an unaligned address
The design assumes an attacker doesn't know where the heap is located,
and uses the ASLR randomness to "sign" the single-linked pointers. We
mark the pointer as P and the location in which it is stored as L, and
the calculation will be:
  * PROTECT(P) := (L >> PAGE_SHIFT) XOR (P)
  * *L = PROTECT(P)
This way, the random bits from the address L (which start at the bits
in the PAGE_SHIFT position), will be merged with the LSB of the stored
protected pointer. This protection layer prevents an attacker from
modifying the pointer into a controlled value.
An additional check that the chunks are MALLOC_ALIGNed adds an
important layer:
  * Attackers can't point to illegal (unaligned) memory addresses
  * Attackers must guess correctly the alignment bits
On standard 32 bit Linux machines, an attacker will directly fail 7
out of 8 times, and on 64 bit machines it will fail 15 out of 16
times.
The proposed solution adds 3-4 asm instructions per malloc()/free()
and therefore has only minor performance implications if it has
any. A similar protection was added to Chromium's version of TCMalloc
in 2013, and according to their documentation the performance overhead
was less than 2%.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyalit@checkpoint.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'libc/stdlib/malloc-standard')
| -rw-r--r-- | libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/free.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/mallinfo.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.h | 12 | 
4 files changed, 21 insertions, 5 deletions
| diff --git a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/free.c b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/free.c index a2d765d41..f3602cf48 100644 --- a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/free.c +++ b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/free.c @@ -214,8 +214,9 @@ void attribute_hidden __malloc_consolidate(mstate av)  		*fb = 0;  		do { +            CHECK_PTR(p);  		    check_inuse_chunk(p); -		    nextp = p->fd; +		    nextp = REVEAL_PTR(&p->fd, p->fd);  		    /* Slightly streamlined version of consolidation code in free() */  		    size = p->size & ~PREV_INUSE; @@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ void free(void* mem)  	set_fastchunks(av);  	fb = &(av->fastbins[fastbin_index(size)]); -	p->fd = *fb; +	p->fd = PROTECT_PTR(&p->fd, *fb);  	*fb = p;      } diff --git a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/mallinfo.c b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/mallinfo.c index dbe4d49b8..992322341 100644 --- a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/mallinfo.c +++ b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/mallinfo.c @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ struct mallinfo mallinfo(void)      fastavail = 0;      for (i = 0; i < NFASTBINS; ++i) { -	for (p = av->fastbins[i]; p != 0; p = p->fd) { +	for (p = av->fastbins[i]; p != 0; p = REVEAL_PTR(&p->fd, p->fd)) { +	    CHECK_PTR(p);  	    ++nfastblocks;  	    fastavail += chunksize(p);  	} diff --git a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.c b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.c index 1a6d4dc1c..1f898eb29 100644 --- a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.c +++ b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.c @@ -260,12 +260,13 @@ void __do_check_malloc_state(void)  	    assert(p == 0);  	while (p != 0) { +	    CHECK_PTR(p);  	    /* each chunk claims to be inuse */  	    __do_check_inuse_chunk(p);  	    total += chunksize(p);  	    /* chunk belongs in this bin */  	    assert(fastbin_index(chunksize(p)) == i); -	    p = p->fd; +	    p = REVEAL_PTR(&p->fd, p->fd);  	}      } @@ -855,7 +856,8 @@ void* malloc(size_t bytes)      if ((unsigned long)(nb) <= (unsigned long)(av->max_fast)) {  	fb = &(av->fastbins[(fastbin_index(nb))]);  	if ( (victim = *fb) != 0) { -	    *fb = victim->fd; +	    CHECK_PTR(victim); +	    *fb = REVEAL_PTR(&victim->fd, victim->fd);  	    check_remalloced_chunk(victim, nb);  	    retval = chunk2mem(victim);  	    goto DONE; diff --git a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.h b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.h index 44120d388..30a696e5a 100644 --- a/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.h +++ b/libc/stdlib/malloc-standard/malloc.h @@ -839,6 +839,18 @@ typedef struct malloc_chunk* mfastbinptr;  #define get_max_fast(M) \    ((M)->max_fast & ~(FASTCHUNKS_BIT | ANYCHUNKS_BIT)) +/* +  Safe-Linking: +  Use randomness from ASLR (mmap_base) to protect single-linked lists +  of fastbins. Together with allocation alignment checks, this mechanism +  reduces the risk of pointer hijacking, as was done with Safe-Unlinking +  in the double-linked lists of smallbins. +*/ +#define PROTECT_PTR(pos, ptr)     ((mchunkptr)((((size_t)pos) >> PAGE_SHIFT) ^ ((size_t)ptr))) +#define REVEAL_PTR(pos, ptr)      PROTECT_PTR(pos, ptr) +#define CHECK_PTR(P)    \ +  if (!aligned_OK(P))   \ +      abort();  /*    morecore_properties is a status word holding dynamically discovered | 
