From 94246e65e20b5390d53858447526b231ef1afd67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Anthony G. Basile" Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 07:56:08 -0400 Subject: libc: add issetugid() issetugid() returns 1 if the process environment or memory address space is considered tainted, and returns 0 otherwise. This happens, for example, when a process's privileges are elevated by the setuid or setgid flags on an executable belonging to root. This function first appeard in OpenBSD 2.0 and is needed for the LibreSSL. This patch follows the same logic as the equivalent musl commit. For more information see the commit message at http://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/commit/?id=ddddec106fd17c3aca3287005d21e92f742aa9d4 Signed-off-by: Anthony G. Basile Signed-off-by: Bernhard Reutner-Fischer --- libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'libc/misc/internals') diff --git a/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c b/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c index a37751f2d..1f1e601e8 100644 --- a/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c +++ b/libc/misc/internals/__uClibc_main.c @@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ #include #endif +/* Are we in a secure process environment or are we dealing + * with setuid stuff? If we are dynamically linked, then we + * already have _dl_secure, otherwise we need to re-examine + * auxvt[] below. + */ +int _pe_secure = 0; +libc_hidden_data_def(_pe_secure) + #ifndef SHARED void *__libc_stack_end = NULL; @@ -391,7 +399,10 @@ void __uClibc_main(int (*main)(int, char **, char **), int argc, __check_one_fd (STDIN_FILENO, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW); __check_one_fd (STDOUT_FILENO, O_RDWR | O_NOFOLLOW); __check_one_fd (STDERR_FILENO, O_RDWR | O_NOFOLLOW); + _pe_secure = 1 ; } + else + _pe_secure = 0 ; #endif __uclibc_progname = *argv; -- cgit v1.2.3